

Dataset of Presidential Powers and Regime Types

December 2021

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Note: The dataset of presidential powers and regime types covers a subset of the data gathered for my article with Pedro F. Ribeiro on the institutional determinants of party unity. It does not include most of the variables utilized in the regression models. You will find replication data on a separate link.

If you want to utilize either of the datasets in your research, you should quote our article:

Borges, André; Ribeiro, Pedro Floriano. “Presidents, Prime Ministers and Legislative Behaviour: The Conditional Effect of Presidential Legislative Powers on Party Unity”. *Government and Opposition*, 1-22, (forthcoming). doi:10.1017/gov.2021.45.

1 - Regime type measures

Regime types were coded following the classificatory scheme originally proposed by Shugart and Carey (1992) and Carey (2005). I relied on the operationalization of regime types and on the comparative data provided by Samuels and Shugart (2010) as a starting point. To classify the countries and periods absent from Samuels and Shugart’s (2010) analysis, I relied to a substantial extent on three measures of regime type available in the V-Dem dataset. The first indicates whether the head of government is appointed (either directly or indirectly) by the legislature (v2_exlegconhog). The second measure indicates whether the head of state is elected (v2_exelechos). Finally, I relied on a categorical variable indicating to what extent the head of state has the power to appoint the whole cabinet without confirmation of the legislature (v2exdfcbhs). Typically, pure presidential systems are characterized by a popularly elected head of state with the power to appoint the cabinet independently of the legislature’s approval. Semi-presidential countries are also characterized by a popularly elected executive, but they differ from presidentialism in what concerns the existence of a prime minister dependent on legislative confidence. Thus, the measures of cabinet appointment powers (v2exdfcbhs) and appointment of the head of government (v2_exlegconhog) were utilized to separate presidential from semi-presidential cases. Finally, parliamentarism differs from presidentialism and semi-presidentialism due to the lack of a directly elected head of state (v2_exelechos).

In addition to extending the original classification of regime types proposed by Samuels and Shugart (2010), I cross checked their data against the information provided by the V-Dem measures. Whenever the classification produced by the latter conflicted with the data obtained from Samuels and Shugart’s (2010), I sought information on other sources, including the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) and the Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP).

The classification produced using the procedures above described was compared with that provided by Sedelius and Linde (2018). I found a very few divergent cases. Again, I obtained additional information on the incongruent cases relying on the previously mentioned sources.

1.1 – Presidentialism (presidential)

Dummy for pure presidentialism. Cases were coded according to the operationalization proposed by Samuels and Shugart (2010).

1.2 – Semi-presidential (semipres)

Dummy for semi-presidentialism. Cases were coded according to the operationalization proposed by Samuels and Shugart (2010).

1.3 – President-parliamentary system (prespar)

Dummy for president-parliamentary countries. Cases were coded according to the operationalization proposed by Samuels and Shugart (2010).

1.4 – Premier-presidentialism (prempres)

Dummy for premier-presidential countries. Cases were coded according to the operationalization proposed by Samuels and Shugart (2010).

1.5 - Parliamentarism (par)

Dummy for parliamentarism. Cases were coded according to the operationalization proposed by Samuels and Shugart (2010).

1.6 – Regime types (govsys)

- 1 – Presidentialism
- 2 – Parliamentarism
- 3 – President-parliamentarism
- 4 – Premier-presidentialism

1.7 – Regime type labels (govsysf)

This variable replaces category numbers used in *govsys* (1.6) for labels.

2 – Presidential powers

Shugart and Carey's (1992) original dataset was expanded and revised according to the coding rules proposed by Metcalf (2000). I included a significant number of additional countries and updated those cases for which we identified relevant changes to presidents' legislative authority. I relied mainly on the Comparative Constitutions Project to obtain information on presidential legislative powers. I also utilized Frye's (2000) database of political institutions in the post-communist world.

Coding rules presented below are taken from Metcalf (2000). I opted for maintaining the ten dimensions of presidential powers as proposed by Shugart and Carey (1992), and therefore, I did not code cases on the additional dimension of judicial review included in Metcalf's (2000) article.

2.1- Legislative powers

2.1.1 - Package Veto/Override (paveto)

Measure of presidents' package veto power.

- 4 - No override
- 3 - Override by extraordinary majority
- 2 - Override by absolute majority of whole membership
- 1 - Override by simple majority of quorum
- 0 - No veto

2.1.2 - Partial Veto/Override (plveto)

This variable measure presidents' power to partially veto legislation.

- 4 - No override
- 3 - Override by extraordinary majority
- 2 - Override by absolute majority of whole membership
- 1 - Override by simple majority of quorum
- 0 No partial veto

2.1.3 – Decree powers (decree)

This variable accounts for presidents' authority to enact legislation utilizing decrees.

- 4- Reserved powers, no rescission
- 2- President has temporary decree authority with few restrictions
- 1- Authority to enact decrees limited
- 0- No decree powers, or only as delegated by assembly

2.1.4 - Exclusive Introduction of Legislation (exintro)

This measure accounts for constitutional provisions that grant to the president the exclusive right to initiate legislation in selected policy areas.

- 4- No amendment by assembly
- 2- Restricted amendment by assembly
- 1- Unrestricted amendment by assembly
- 0- No exclusive powers

2.1.5 - Budgetary Powers (budget)

Measure of presidents' budgetary powers.

- 4- President prepares budget; no amendment permitted
- 3- Assembly may reduce but not increase amount of budget items
- 2- President sets upper limit on total spending, within which assembly may amend
- 1- Assembly may increase expenditures only if it designates new revenues
- 0- Unrestricted authority of assembly to prepare or amend budget

2.1.6 - Proposal of Referenda (referenda)

Measure of presidents' authority to propose referenda.

- 4- Unrestricted
- 2- Restricted
- 1- Countersignature of minister required
- 0- No presidential authority to propose referenda

2.2 - Nonlegislative Powers

2.2.1 - Cabinet Formation (cabinet)

This is a measure of presidents' authority over the appointment of cabinet ministers.

- 4- President appoints ministers without need for assembly confirmation
- 3- President appoints ministers with consent of assembly
- 2- President names cabinet ministers subject to confirmation or investiture by assembly
- 1- President nominates prime minister, who needs confidence of assembly; prime minister appoints other ministers, possibly with consent of president
- 0- President cannot name ministers except upon recommendation of assembly

2.2.2 – Cabinet dismissal (cabinet2)

This second measure of cabinet authority accounts for presidents' ability to fire ministers at will.

- 4- President dismisses ministers at will
- 3- President dismisses ministers with consent of assembly
- 2- President dismisses ministers, but only under certain conditions
- 1- President dismisses ministers on the proposal of the prime minister
- 0- Ministers may be removed only by assembly on vote of censure

2.2.3 – Censure (censure)

This measure accounts for the legislature's authority to dismiss the cabinet or individual ministers, but the scale is inverted such that higher scores indicate limited or no power to remove cabinet members.

- 4 -Assembly may not censure and remove cabinet or ministers
- 2 -Assembly may censure, but president may respond by dissolving assembly

1 -“Constructive” vote of no confidence (assembly majority must present alternative cabinet)

0 Unrestricted censure

2.2.4 - Dissolution of Assembly (diss)

Measure of president’s authority to dissolve the assembly and call new elections.

4- Unrestricted

3- Restricted by frequency or point within term

2- Requires new presidential election

1- Restricted: only as response to specific events

0- No provision

2.3 – Aggregate presidential power indexes

2.3.1 – Presidential legislative powers (legpres)

This is a simple additive index of presidents’ legislative authority. It is calculated as the sum of the scores for each of the six dimensions of legislative powers originally proposed by Shugart and Carey’s (1992). The aggregate score of presidential legislative powers ranges from 0 to 24.

2.3.2 – Presidential powers (prespowers)

This is a simple additive index of presidents’ legislative and nonlegislative authority. It is calculated as the sum of the scores for each of the ten dimensions of presidential powers originally proposed by Shugart and Carey’s (1992). The aggregate score of presidential powers ranges from 0 to 40.

References:

Frye T. (1997) A politics of institutional choice: post-communist presidencies. *Comparative Political Studies* 30: 523-552.

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Samuels D and Shugart M. (2010) *Presidents, Parties and Prime Ministers: How the separation of powers affects party organization and behavior*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sedelius T and Linde J. (2018) Unravelling semi-presidentialism: democracy and government performance in four distinct regime types. *Democratization* 25: 136-157.

Shugart, Matthew S. (2005). “Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive and Mixed Authority Patterns.”. *French Politics* 3, no. 3: 323–351.

Shugart M and Carey JM. (1992) *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional design and electoral dynamics*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.